Kentucky Board of Claims by Richardson, James R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 35 | Issue 4 Article 2
1947
Kentucky Board of Claims
James R. Richardson
Department of Highways, Commonwealth of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richardson, James R. (1947) "Kentucky Board of Claims," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 35 : Iss. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol35/iss4/2
KENTUCKY BOARD OF CLAIIS
By JAMES R. RICHARDSON*
The 1946 session of the General Assembly of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky passed Senate Bill 1161 entitled "An Act
creating a Board of Claims." This act has now been indexed as
Section 176.290-.380 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.2  It is
an act which is of timely interest to the legal profession of Ken-
tucky and to all who use the state maintained highways of Ken-
tucky, or who own property adjoining such highways.
The act sets up a Board of Claims composed of a judge or
commissioner of the Court of Appeals, the Attorney General
and the Commissioner of Finance. The Board is empowered to
hear proof and compensate persons for personal injury or prop-
erty damage resulting from negligence in the construction, re-
construction, maintenance and policing of highways by the De-
partment of Highways. The jurisdiction of the'Board is further
limited to claims where the amount in controversy does not ex-
ceed the sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, exclusive
of interest and costs.
The reason as to why it was necessary for an act bf the
legislature to permit individuals to sue the State finds its basis
in the common law conception of immunity, whereby a state, by
reason of its sovereignty, is immune from suit, and it cannot
be sued without its consent in its own courts, 3 the courts of a
sister state, 4 or, by an individual in the federal courts.5  The
state's immunity from suit is given expression by section 231
of the constitution to which reference is made hereinafter.
Various foundations for the principle upon which this
exemption of liability from suit is based have been given, the
broader reason being that it would be inconsistent with the very
idea of supreme executive power, and would encumber the per-
formance of public duties.6
*LL.B., University of Kentucky. Address: Law Section, State
Department of Highways, Frankfort, Ky.
IKy. Acts 1946, c. 1189, Sec. 3(b).
'KY. R.S. (1946) 176.290-176.380.
4Ky. State Park Com. v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W. 2d 38
(1935).
'Paulus v. State of South- Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52
(1929).
Palmer v. State of Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 295 S. Ct. 16 (1918).
McClellan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605, 170 Pac. 662(1911).
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To say that the state is immune from suit is a broad state-
ment and broadly speaking this is true. However, there are
certain limitations on such immunity.
Section 13 of our constitution provides that no man's prop-
erty shall be taken or applied to public use, without the consent
of his representatives and without just compensation being pre-
viously made to him.
Section 242 which reserves the right of eminent domain to
the state also provides for just compensation to the owner for
property taken, injured or destroyed by those invested with the
privilege of taking property for public use.
In Lehman v. Williams et al. the plaintiff relied on the
above two sections of the constitution and, without securing per-
mission, sued the Department of Highways through its com-
missioner for the alleged wrongful diversion of water onto his
land during the construction and in the maintenance of a state
highway adjacent to his land.
The court held that there was a taking or injuring of
plaintiff's land within the meaning of sections 13 and 242 of the
constitution.
In another very recent case s the plaintiff had secured
permission to sue the state by means of a resolution for damages
to his land, due to a cut and fill being made adjacent to his
land when the highway was reconstructed. He was forced to
build a retaining wall to prevent rocks and dirt sliding onto his
property. Although this suit was by permission, the court showed
this was unnecessary when it said "There was a taking or
injuring of appellee's property within the meaning of the con-
stitution."
The cited cases are not a departure from previous de-
cisions, but are supported by a long line of authority cited there-
in. From these decisions we may adduce the rule that, where
private property is taken for public use, or where there is a
trespass which amounts to such taking, the Commonwealth's
immunity from suit is waived.
In considering such a piece of legislation, questions
naturally arise as to the necessity for, or desirability of it, and
-301 Ky. 752, 193 S.W. 2d 159 (1946).S Commonwealth et al. v. Tate et al., 297 Ky. 826, 181 S.W. 2d
418 (1944).
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the situation, if any, which it will relieve. The Department of
Highways operates over three thousand (3000) pieces of equip-
ment, from bulldozer to jeep, and maintains roads in the hun-
dred and twenty counties of the state. Accidents involving
damage to real property, personal property and personal in-
juries are inevitable. The writer knows from personal ex-
perience that these accidents are not few and that hardships
often result due to the state not being amenable to suit in most
instances as shown above.
Heretofore one who suffered damages due to the negligence
of a Highway Department employee was subject to the pleasure
of the General Assembly, which meets once in two years, in
passing a resolution granting permission to sue. Section 231 of
the Kentucky Constitution provides that "The General Assem-
bly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits
may be brought against the Commonwealth."
Let us consider a practical situation under the procedure
followed before the Board of Claims came into existence. Sup-
pose you are operating a motor vehicle on a state maintained
road when struck by a state truck, which is clearly at fault,
causing several hundred dollars damage. The Department of
Highways would like to settle, as is often the case, but its hands
are tied. Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution provides
that "No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except
in pursuance of appropriations made by law." You would
then bear your own loss until the state legislature meets in
January, 1948, at which time you would prevail upon your
representative to introduce in your behalf a resolution to sue
and hope for its passage.
At the 1946 session of the General Assembly, 185 resolutions
were introduced." Of this number approximately 150 author-
ized suits against the various state agencies; 58 were claims'
against the Department of Highways and 16 of them became
law. The odds were not in favor of the claimant.
In these days of wide travel many out-of-state motorists
use our highways and our files reveal that they are at times
involved in accidents with highway equipment. Where the
damage is small, they stand their own losses rather than attempt
Legislative Digest, Vol. 32, No. 48.
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to follow the tedious and, in their cases, impractical procedure
of securing the passage of a resolution. As will be shown, such
persons are not without redress under the rules of procedure
as promulgated by the new Board of Claims.
These resolutions are mentioned primarily for the bearing
they have on the individual's right to sue which is of immediate
concern. However, the resolutions themselves raise two ques-
tions which are of more than passing interest. Firstly, in Com-
monwealth v. Daniet ° it was held that a resolution permitting
a motorist, who collided with a Department of Highways' truck,
to sue for any amount not exceeding $6,000.00, was not violative
of the constitutional provision prohibiting the General Assembly
from limiting the amount to be recovered from injury to person
or property. 1 The court said that the sovereign, waiving its
immunity from suit, can impose such limitations as it sees fit.
Secondly, in the case of Carr v. Jefferson County 12 it was held
that the General Assembly lacked authority to pass a resolution
permitting an individual to sue a county for the tort of one of
its servants. It was agreed that, as the county was an arm of the
Commonwealth, it came within the provisions of section 231 of
the Kentucky Constitution. The court did not rebut this, but
held that the ,resolution offends section 59 of our constitution
which prohibits the passage of local or special acts.
The question may well be put as to why a resolution to sue
the state is not a special act. The court perhaps reached the
correct conclusion, which should be applicable to suits against
counties as well, but its method in reaching the conclusion does
not seem sound to the writer. The court reasoned as follows:
"In Commonwealth v. Haly"3 this court, in replying to a*n
argument that a joint resolution of the General Assembly author-
izing an individual to sue the state contravenes section 59 of the
constitution and, therefore, was special legislation, and such
authority could be given only by a general law, stated this had
been the policy of the General Assembly for a century and we
would not overturn it." The Haly case was decided in 1899, so,
in the instant case, it was set forth that, as the policy was now
10266 Ky. 285, 98 S.W. 2d 987 (1936).
KY. CONST., Sec. 54.
12275 Ky. 685, 122 S.W. 2d 482. (1938).
106-Ky. 716, 51 S.W. 430 (1899).
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one hundred and fifty years old, the court did not feel justified
in overturning it.
Other jurisdictions have found different, and probably
sounder, reasons for permitting such resolutions in the fact of
constitutional prohibitions against special and local laws,
"Generally constitutional provisions against special and local
laws do not prohibit a statute from granting a single individual
the right to sue the state on a right which he previously pos-
sesses, for mere authority to assert a right is not a special favor
or advantage productive of inequality such as is condemned by
the constitution.' 4
It can readily be seen that the Board of Claims will reduce
the number of resolutions before the General Assembly. This
is a costly procedure, taking up much valuable time of legislators
who have a very limited time to give to other and more weighty
matters. This waiver of immunity constitutes a wide departure
from former procedure and tradition for this state. It is by no
means an innovation. Hany states, including New York, Mas-
sachusetts, Illinois, West Virginia, Indiana, Ohio and Tennessee
have Claims Boards of a similar nature.
As in the case of resolutions there is a constitutional pro-
vision which could conceivably affect the legality of the Ken-
tucky Board of Claims. Section 135 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion is as follows: "No courts, save those provided for in this
constitution shall be established."
The Kentucky constitution provides for the Court of
Appeals, the various Circuit Courts, County Courts and Police
Courts. The question is then whether or not this Board of
Claims is a new court and consequently repugnant to the con-
stitution. The word "Court" has been avoided in the act
setting up the agency for hearing claims. Naturally use of the
word "Board" will not take the agency out of the category of
courts, if it is, in fact, a court.
It is extremely doubtful that objections to the legality of
the Board of Claims will be raised, as it will undoubtedly be
generally recognized as a constructive adjunct to our system of
jurisprudence. Aside from what is thought to be desirable as-
pects of the act, should this question arise as regards disburse-
,' 59 C.J. Sec. 458, p. 303.
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ments from the State Treasury by the Board, it is believed that
an affirmative answer to the Board's constitutionality is found
in the case of Greene v. Caldwel et al.15 Here the Workmen's
Compensation Board of Kentucky was attacked on various con-
stitutional grounds, one of which was that the Board was a new
Court in contravention of Section 135 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
In meeting this latter objection, the Court said in effect
that the parties voluntarily put themselves before the Board;
that the Board's decision was appealable; that, as a matter of
fact, it was merely an agency created by the Legislature for the
purpose of assisting the courts in preliminary findings of fact;
and that the Board merely acts as a board of arbitration from
whose decision they may appeal to the courts if dissatisfied.
The above seems fully applicable to the Board of Claims itself,
when one considers the act creating it.
The Board of Claims, as previously stated, consists of three
members, and by law holds regular meetings on the second Tues-
day in May, November and January. These meetings are held
in the auditorium of the New State Office Building in Frank-
fort. Claims must be presented to the Board by filing a petition
within one year from the time it first occurred, provided that
claims arising between January 1, 1945, and June 19, 1946, must
be presented to the Board prior to second Tuesday in January,
1947.
The Board at its regular meetings calls the docket and sets
claims for hearing or enters order of award where judgment iN
confessed. The Board is considered as in continuous session to
enter orders and awards by agreement of the parties. The Board
has appointed a referee, and may appoint special referees, to
hear proof either in person or by deposition. Orders of the
Board are enforceable by filing an authenticated copy of the
award with the clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court. Appeals
may be taken to the Franklin Circuit Court, where the amount
in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, is over $50.00.
Appeals may be taken from the Circuit Court to the Court of
Appeals where made reviewable by the Civil Code of Practice.
Copies of Rules of Practice and Procedure may be had by writ-
ing the clerk of The Board.
170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
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At this writing there have been seventeen (17) claims filed
before the Board ranging in amounts from $200.00 to $1000.00.
They involve both property damage and personal injury from
alleged negligence, such as motor vehicle collisions, burning of
hay on lands adjoining the right of way, and rocks falling onto
tie highway from the right of way.
It is believed not unlikely that this act will prove its worth
to the point that some future session of the General Assembly
will widen its scope to include all branches of the state govern-
ient. That this comment is not out of line with the present
trend is shown by the fact that our Federal Government may
now be sued by an individual for a negligent or wrongful act
(or omission of any employee acting within the scope of and
ourse of his employment. This law is part of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 and is knownc as the "Federal Tort
Claim Act."1
An interesting part of this new act is that, where claims
do not exceed $1000.00, the agency involved is authorized to
negotiate and make settlements. In cases where the amount in
controversy exceeds $1000.00, the Claim must be filed in Federal
District Court with service on the United States Attorney.
"Public Law 601, Title IV.
